The paper assesses the role of a Reserve Bank in the Federal Reserve System. It compares the Eurosystem with the Fed System, and offers suggestions for the Eurosystem based on the Fed's experience. A regional presence facilitates surveillance of the economy and helps a central bank to communicate with the public. Competition among regional banks stimulates innovative thinking on operational, research, and policy questions. The Chairman (President) of the system should be strong enough to encourage diverse views in the monetary policy committee and to build a consensus for decisive and timely policy actions as needed. 
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A modern central bank seeks to maintain a financial environment within which competitive markets support the efficient use of productive resources. The overarching principle is that a central bank should provide the necessary monetary and financial stability in a way that leaves the maximum freedom of action to private markets. In keeping with this principle, monetary policy is implemented by indirect means, with an interest rate policy instrument rather than with direct credit controls. In the banking sphere every effort is made to minimize as far as possible the regulatory burden associated with financial oversight.
The principle that markets should be given free reign wherever possible creates three difficulties of understanding that a central bank must overcome in order to carry out its policies effectively. The presumption that monetary and banking policies are best when they are as unobtrusive as possible creates the first difficulty. Inevitably, central banks seem shadowy and distant from the public's point of view. Yet, to work well, central bank policies need to shape the expectations of households and businesses. Monetary policy encourages economic growth and stabilizes employment over the business cycle by anchoring inflation and inflation expectations. Bank supervision and regulation aims to promote confidence in the banking system. The need to influence expectations and promote confidence puts a premium on credibility, a commitment to goals, and a central bank's perceived independence and competence to achieve its objectives. Thus, a central bank must create in the public's mind an understanding of the methods by which its objectives can be sustained. This formidable problem has to be overcome in spite of the fact that a central bank operates in the background, with obscure methods and procedures.
The second and third difficulties arise because central bankers must understand markets. Dynamic markets introduce evermore efficient productive technologies and create new goods and services to better satisfy consumer wants. A regional presence also benefits a central bank with responsibilities for bank supervision and regulation, and the power to extend emergency credit 3 assistance to troubled financial institutions. Specialized knowledge of local economies, industries, and businesses is of use to bank examiners, and helpful in determining whether a troubled bank deserves emergency credit assistance.
Likewise, central banks that play a role in the provision of payments services run far-flung operations through their regional offices.
Last but not least, the diversification of research within a system of central banks brings a variety of analytical perspectives to policy deliberations that is invaluable in our increasingly complex economy. Moreover, a system of regional banks led by the center institution harnesses competitive forces to encourage innovative thinking within the central bank. Reserve System. The United States has seen a deconcentration of metropolitan employment that appears to be the result of urban congestion and technologies that make it increasingly possible to locate businesses away from traditional urban centers.
2 The tendency is toward an equalization of regional economic activity. Economic analysis is a great equalizer among members of the FOMC. An argument based on economic reasoning that can be challenged and debated in the language of economics is ultimately more influential than an intuitive assertion about the economy or policy, no matter who expresses it and how strongly it is held. 14 central bankers that some sort of explicit mandate for low inflation is beneficial.
Yet, the Congress has not mandated in a clear way that the Fed place a priority on low inflation. Consequently, Fed officials bear the burden of responsibility for educating the public about the benefits of low inflation. Second, the guiding tactical principle of monetary policy is to preempt inflation, or deflation, for that matter. For instance, a well-timed preemptive increase in the intended federal funds rate such as occurred in 1994 is nothing to be feared. The 1994 monetary tightening was almost certainly necessary to keep inflation from ending the business expansion. If the Fed is to successfully maintain price stability, it must create an understanding of the need for policy to be preemptive; and the Fed must build a consensus for specific preemptive policy actions when they are needed. On the objectives for monetary policy, the Maastricht Treaty states unambiguously that the primary objective of the Eurosystem shall be to maintain price stability. Although the treaty obliges the Eurosystem to support the general economic policies of the European Union, that support is to be without prejudice to the objective of price stability. Accordingly, the Eurosystem mandate is considerably more definite than the objectives given in the Federal Reserve Act.
The Maastricht Treaty safeguards the independence of the Eurosystem.
The Eurosystem charter is an international treaty that cannot be revoked without unanimous consent of the signatories. Moreover, the treaty itself actually tells the Eurosystem not to take instructions from other institutions in the European Union.
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The greatest threat to the Eurosystem's independence and the pursuit of price stability could come from the ambiguity in the treaty on exchange rate policy, which is to be established by the European Council. It is not completely clear how a conflict between exchange rate and price stability objectives would be settled.
On transparency, the Maastricht Treaty mandates that the ECB publish quarterly and annual reports. Executive Board members have signaled their willingness to testify regularly before the European Parliament. The ECB intends to keep the public informed of its policy actions and thinking through press conferences, speeches, and other regular publications. The President of the ECB holds a press conference to discuss monetary policy immediately after one of the two Governing Council meetings held each month. Notably, the treaty specifies that the proceedings of the meetings shall be confidential, but that the Governing
Council may decide to make the outcome of its deliberations public. Governor Strong sterilized gold flows and instead tried to stabilize the price level. 9 In large part, Strong's personal discretion substituted for the lack of an agreed objective. The Eurosystem's price stability mandate should go a long way toward preserving the decisiveness of the Governing Council.
Second, it will take some time for the Eurosystem to develop and become familiar with euro-area data. But on the whole, much better macroeconomic data exist today than were available to the early Fed. This, too, should make the Governing Council more decisive than the early Open Market Committee. To sum up, the analogy with the early Fed is far from conclusive. With the help of the support systems described above, the Governing Council should be able to strike a reasonable balance between decentralization and decisiveness.
7) SUBSIDIARITY AND ECB STAFFING
One problematic issue facing the Eurosystem is the nature of the control that the NCBs will exercise over the staffing budget of the ECB according to the principle of subsidiarity. This is critical because, as the discussion of the Federal
Reserve System makes clear, the Eurosystem cannot function effectively without a sufficiently strong ECB. The ECB must perform certain tasks. For instance, the ECB must represent the Eurosystem in its external relationships. Presumably, only the President of the ECB can speak for the Governing Council. Also, the ECB is the natural home for economists following the euro-area economy as a whole. The ECB is a natural repository for euro-area data, and its economists will assume primary responsibility (though by no means an exclusive one) for following and interpreting these data for the Eurosystem.
In addition, the ECB needs a staff with analytical capabilities sufficient to support the President in his role as leader of the Eurosystem. Among other things, the ECB's staff, working with the staff at the NCBs, must devise an analytical framework that can help the President of the ECB guide the members of the Governing Council in their monetary policy deliberations.
The funding of the ECB staff must be authorized by the NCB governors.
Yet the NCBs lack the experience to judge the ECB's priorities and needs. The problem is two-fold. First, NCBs know relatively little about managing independent monetary policy. Second, NCBs have little experience as regional banks in a system of central banks. The division of labor between the NCBs and the ECB will have to be worked out gradually over time.
One hopes that the NCBs will agree to build up staff at the ECB fast enough to provide the leadership that the Eurosystem needs. Finally, the NCBs have relatively large research departments compared to the ECB, and extensive operational experience in financial and banking markets.
The competence of the Eurosystem will depend on the ability of the ECB to draw on the talents of staff at the NCBs, as need be, for the good of the system as a whole.
Working Relationships on the Governing Council
Despite the safeguards in the Maastricht Treaty, the independence of the Eurosystem is at risk because the regional members of the Governing Council represent countries. Members could be influenced by their governments. Votes on the Governing Council could be traded for those on other governing bodies of the European Union. As mentioned above, the ambiguity on exchange rate policy opens the door to political interference in monetary policy. Politically motivated disputes could greatly complicate the business of the Governing Council. Such conflicts could cause indecisiveness, inconsistent policy actions, and a loss of credibility.
FOMC experience suggests a number of additional measures to prevent the politicization of the Governing Council. First, a macroeconomic framework should be developed to guide policy deliberations. The framework should be rich enough to encompass a wide variety of views and sufficiently coherent to provide the basis for prioritizing concerns and building a consensus for policy actions.
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The Governing Council should utilize economic arguments disciplined by the price stability objective to smoke out and defuse political rhetoric. Economic reasoning is, to repeat, a great equalizer.
Second, the ECB President's role in the Governing Council should be strengthened so that he can guide the debate within the agreed upon framework.
The ECB President should act against free riding by encouraging members of the Governing Council to prepare thoroughly and to participate actively. The effectiveness of members would be enormously enhanced if each were allowed to bring an economist advisor to the meetings. A verbatim transcript of the meetings should be produced, if only for internal use, to facilitate the give and take that must occur over time.
Third, the macroeconomic framework should be explained to the public in some detail so that Eurosystem watchers can more readily exercise professional discipline on the internal debate. 13 Minutes without individual attribution, published shortly after each Governing Council meeting, would help focus Eurosystem watchers on issues of concern to policymakers. Over the long run, greater transparency can serve as a powerful safeguard against political interference.
Admittedly, the FOMC never had the potential for internal international disputes that exists in the Governing Council. However, FOMC experience suggests that the above-mentioned practices would facilitate the development of productive professional working relationships in the Council. 13 See Issing (1998) .
Broadening Public Support for the Eurosystem
The Bundesbank has an admirable monetary policy record in large part because it always had the full support of the German public for its price stability objective. That support was there because the Bundesbank was associated in the public's mind with the postwar economic miracle that began in the late 1940s at the time that the D-mark and the Bundesbank were created.
The European public has little natural affinity for the new Eurosystem.
As was the case for the Federal Reserve System, the Eurosystem will have to earn the public's confidence. If anything, public relations will be more difficult for the Eurosystem than they have been for the Federal Reserve System because the euro area is made up of eleven different countries whose citizens speak many different languages. The Eurosystem should make extensive use of the regional presence of its NCBs to broaden the understanding of its mission and methods, much as the Fed uses the Reserve Banks.
The Eurosystem has one big advantage over the Fed in explaining itself to the public. In contrast to the Fed, whose mandate only exists in the Federal Reserve Act and is ambiguous at that, the Eurosystem's price stability mandate is unambiguous and part of one of the founding documents of the European Union.
9) SUMMARY
The main message of the paper is that regional ( Federal Reserve experience teaches that a decentralized system needs a strong center. Staff at the center needs to be large enough to support a strong Chairman (President) of the system. The Chairman must be strong enough to encourage diverse views in the policy committee and to build a consensus for decisive and timely policy actions. The Chairman should exploit diversity and promote decisiveness.
The key to success in the Eurosystem, in addition to the above-mentioned points, is to establish good working relationships on the Governing Council. To facilitate this, the staff at the center should take the lead in developing a macroeconomic framework within which diverse policy views can be expressed and debated productively. Personal advisors should accompany members to the policy meetings. Verbatim transcripts should be prepared for internal use to facilitate an exchange of views over time. Minutes without individual attribution should be published to present opposing views clearly, to focus central bank watchers, and to guard against the potential for politically motivated policy mistakes.
The Eurosystem and the Federal Reserve System will succeed in the long run by broadening the public's understanding and support for low inflation and the preemptive policy procedures to maintain price stability. The way to do that is to involve the Reserve Bank presidents (National Central Bank governors) and their advisors fully in the policymaking process, and to utilize the system's regional presence to take the central bank's monetary policy message to the public.
